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Introduction
Not all intellectual property rights grant the right to
exclude that is indicative of "property rules," as that
term was used by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas
Melamed in their seminal article.' Some intellectual
property rights are "liability rules" in which the right
holder has an entitlement to compensation for use of
the protected invention, not a right to preclude the
use.2 Although patent laws normally grant a right to
exclude others from use of the protected invention as
a default, most countries' laws allow the government
to convert the patent property rule into a liability rule
through a compulsory license. It has been noted, for
example, that by the end of the 1950s, the U.S. had
issued compulsory licenses covering 40 to 50 thou-
sand patents, including substantial portions of the
patent portfolios of AT&T, General Electric, IBM, and
Xerox.3 The U.S. Supreme Court recently expressed a
willingness to accept liability rules over injunctions in
some patent infringement cases. 4
The World Trade Organization's (WTO) agreement
on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
recognizes the authority of governments to authorize
the "use of the subject matter of a patent without the
authorization of the right holder, including use by the
government or third parties auithorized by the govern-
ment"5 Under TRIPS, this authority allows the pat-
ent right to be converted from a property rule into
a liability rule, granting the patent holder a right to
"adequate remuneration" for use of the patent rather
than the right to preclude all competition. 6 The right
of countries to use compulsory licenses to promote
access to medicines has been repeatedly reaffirmed in
international law, including through the Doha Decla-
ration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
issued at the 2001 WTO Ministerial Meeting.7
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Assuming that the degree of compensation that is
"adequate" under TRIPS may be significantly lower
than the full scope of profits that could have been
secured through exploiting an exclusive market-
ing right to its full, a compulsory license may lead
to a reduced incentive for innovation. This poten-
tial impact of compulsory licensing is raised repeat-
edly by industry interests and by many developed
countries were allowed access to generic versions of
medicines protected by patents in rich countries. Even
though the free riding by poor countries in the second
scenario was shown to have a negative effect on the
overall welfare in rich countries (by cutting into the
funds available for R&D to develop future medicines),
Scherer found that overall global welfare is most likely
increased by allowing poor countries access to low-
Some intellectual property rights are 'liability rules,"' in which the
right holder has an entitlement to compensation for use of
the protected invention, not a right to preclude the use.
country governments. In response to recent compul-
sory licenses for essential medicines by Thailand, for
example, the then European Commissioner for Trade
Peter Mandelson stated that "[tihe use of compulsory
licensing should not become a standard way of doing
business, because systematic recourse to compulsory
licensing would eventually be detrimental to the pat-
ent system, and so to innovation and the development
of new medicines " 8 This paper seeks to address that
concern directly. When should recourse to compulsory
licensing become, in Mandelson's words, "systematic?"
And is the need to expand access to patented essential
medicines in a poor country such a case?
In any individual case, choosing to issue a compul-
sory license involves a trade-off between consumer
benefits today (through greater access at a competitive
price) and consumer benefits in the future (through
greater innovation). Compulsory licensing becomes
more attractive when it is predictable that the former
is greater than the latter. Systematic use of compulsory
licensing likewise may be a justifiable policy response
if there are characteristic features of the market that
result in the benefits from greater access today being
routinely higher than the benefits from increased
incentives for innovation through the exclusive right.
A number of studies have examined the link between
the welfare of people who need medicines and profits
for pharmaceutical firms to fund research and devel-
opment for new drugs. Many have recognized the need
for poor countries to access low-cost medicines. 9 In a
key contribution in this regard, F. M. Scherer studied
the overall global welfare effects (not just for develop-
ing countries) of allowing poor countries a "free ride"
on the innovations spurred by intellectual property
in the global north. He compared a scenario under
which medicines were protected by product patents
all over the world to a scenario under which poor
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cost medicines because the marginal utility of income
(the benefit derived from one extra unit of currency) is
greater in poor nations than in rich ones.10
This paper expands on the economic scholarship
on compulsory licensing by showing that in countries
with very high income inequality, which characterizes
many developing countries, market forces may pro-
duce incentives for patent holders to maximize profits
by pricing their products to serve only the wealthiest
sliver of the population. Such pricing creates massive
social costs through lack of treatment for the poor
majority. In the balance of benefits and costs of such
a system, the costs are likely to be disproportionately
large. Fundamentally, we argue that where such a
systematic failure of the exclusive right-based patent
systems for needed medicines in developing countries
occurs, compulsory licensing to create open access to
patents on needed medicines in such countries may be
more broadly justified.
We begin with a brief discussion of patents and
monopoly economics, and describe how monopolies,
including those created by patents, raise prices and
increase profits in the average case described in most
basic economics text books. In this average case, the
price increases allowed by patent monopolies is not
necessarily harmful to overall social welfare, assuming
that the increased profits benefits consumers on the
whole through increased incentives to innovate in the
future. We then show that the balance of benefits and
costs changes, however, in a market with highly convex
demand curves. In such a market, the profit-maximiz-
ing firm will raise prices much higher to serve only the
portion of the demand curve which is highly inelastic,
creating large deadweight losses because of the sub-
stantial fraction of the market unable to afford those
high prices. After presenting these basic economic
premises, we advance to a specific discussion of how
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income inequality produces highly convex demand
curves for essential medicines, comparing the profit-
maximizing strategies in South Africa and Norway as
explanatory examples. In the final section, we argue
that situations of highly convex demand curves are
the norm in many developing countries, and therefore
may warrant a systematic compulsory licensing policy,
such as that available under "essential facilities" anti-
trust standards and license of right patent law clauses,
with means outside of the patent system explored for
incentivizing innovation.
Balancing Costs and Benefits of Essential
Medicine Patent Monopolies
A patent is a government-created right to the exclusive
use of an innovation for a fixed period of time, subject
to various limitations designed to protect public inter-
ests. It is granted as an imperfect incentive to create
and share new inventions." The reason that a period of
exclusive use is an incentive to innovate is that it may
enable the patentee to obtain some monopoly profits
during the period of the patent. Granting exclusive use
of an innovation creates costs: typically, the monopoly
price of a product will be higher than if it were com-
petitively provided. In the case of essential medicines
in developing countries, the typical costs and benefits
of exclusive rights are skewed. High inequality in the
demand side of the market creates incentives for patent
holders to price out the large majority of the popula-
tion from access to the product. To the extent that this
problem is systematic - not cabined to a few specific
diseases (such as AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria) or
to least developed countries - the discussion we offer
below is relevant to a wider set of situations and may
have wider policy implications.2
Monopoly Economics
Patents do not always create
monopolies. Many patents give
the holder an exclusive right to
produce a product that has many
substitutes and therefore normal
competitive markets will restrain
the patent holders' pricing. 13
Indeed, there is no guarantee that
a patented item will not be func-
tionally inferior to substitutes,
denying the patent any real mar-
ket value.
Patents may create monopolies
where there is no effective sub-
stitute for the patented product.
This may be the case when the
patent covers the active ingredi-
ent for a needed medicine if other medicines cannot
be readily substituted. Such a patent gives its holder
the ability to set price for the good, restrained only
by the extent to which refusals of consumers to pay
the higher price will ultimately decrease profits from
a lower volume of sales.14 The more the demand for
the good is inelastic (meaning that consumers are
less likely to decrease consumption with each price
increase), the higher the price that can be profitably
demanded by the monopolist.
Pricing above marginal costs creates two losses for
consumers. The first loss is a wealth transfer from
consumers to the monopolist, since every unit pur-
chased is at a higher price than consumers would pay
a competitive producer. In the case of an innovative
monopolist, including a monopoly created by a patent,
such a transfer from consumers to the monopolist may
be thought to be the reward for innovation.
The second loss from monopoly pricing is a "dead-
weight loss" from forgone transactions which would
have taken place at the lower competitive price. These
lost sales are known as "deadweight" because they
do not create surplus for the buyer or seller; the sur-
plus benefit that would have gone to consumers sim-
ply disappears, and is not compensated by any gain
to the monopolist. In pharmaceutical markets, this
deadweight loss is often referred to as the problem of
"access": the poor may not purchase a drug product
because of its high price, and as a result, are untreated.
Had the price been lower, more people would have
been able to afford the drug and would have been
treated. Thus, for drugs essential to life and health, the
term deadweight loss created by patented drug pricing
takes on added significance.
Figure I
Straight Demand Curve
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Patents and Standard Demand Curves
Patents on ordinary goods lead to higher prices - but
not necessarily to unreasonably high prices. A monop-
olist is constrained by the overall market demand
when it is setting price and output. If prices rise too
high, then the monopolist loses too many customers
who may make a decision not to buy the product.
Figure 1 shows the type of demand curve typically
drawn in economics textbooks, with price shown on
the vertical axis, and the quantity of products sold on
the horizontal. To keep things simple, it is assumed
that the cost of production is approximately zero. 15 If
the good were competitively produced, it would have
a price of about zero. There would be zero profits, but
all consumers who are willing and able to pay a price
higher than its average cost of production would buy
it, and there would be no deadweight loss.
The monopolist will pick the profit-maximizing
output for any given demand curve, raising the price
until the decrease in sales offsets the increased profits
per sale. In the above scenario, the seller could sell a
quantity of 99 goods for 1 unit of currency (hereafter,
USD), yielding sales of $99. It can raise the price to $2
and will loose one sale (selling 98 goods instead of 99).
But the resulting increase in income per sale more
than makes up for the loss of demand (enabling earn-
ings of $196). Here, the monopolist will stop raising
prices when it sells 50 goods for $50, earning $2500
in sales. Beyond this point, the seller loses money by
the lost sales at higher prices. Thus, the profit-max-
imizing price, given this demand curve, would be
about $50. Because all of the consumers would pur-
chase the product at the competitive price, the area
below the demand curve and to the right of 50 units is
marked as "deadweight loss." The wealth transfer from
Convex Demand Curve
1 9 17 25 33 41 49 57 65 73
consumer to producer is marked "producer surplus."
An important point is that producer surplus (2500)
is about twice as large as the DWL (1250), so that it
provides a strong incentive for innovation, compared
to current welfare losses owing to the deadweight loss.
Patents and Highly Convex Demand Curves
The profit maximizing pricing strategies for a firm
with a monopoly are altered by the shape and slope
of the demand curve. The slope of the demand curve
may be affected by the elasticity of demand. A monop-
olist will be more restrained if consumers are more
willing to shift to an inferior substitute or do without
the good as prices rise. More elasticity in the demand
market results in a demand curve that is more flat on
the horizontal plane; less elasticity results in a steeper
demand curve. A perfectly inelastic demand curve,
meaning that consumers will not curb their demand at
any price, will be vertical. A horizontal demand curve
would mean that the smallest price increase would
eliminate all consumer purchases.
Most demand curves are not straight lines, as in
Figure 1, but rather have some element of convexity
or concavity. Convexity indicates that some segment
of the market (the flatter part of the demand curve)
will be highly elastic - giving up the purchase with a
slight price increase. Another segment of the market
is likely to be more inelastic - willing to pay much
higher prices for access. And some part of the market
will exist on points along the curve between these two
extremes.
Suppose that the demand for a good is highly con-
vex, as illustrated in Figure 2. This figure is drawn with
-a convex demand curve and so that the area under
the demand curve is the same as the area under the
demand curve in Figure 1.16 Given
this demand curve, if the product
were offered competitively, the
surplus in the market would be
5000, just the same as the com-
petitive market given the demand
curve drawn in Figure 1.
The shape of the demand
curve changes the profit-max-
imizing price in a predictable
way. Attempting to capture a sig-
nificant portion of the flat/elas-
tic part of the demand curve is
unprofitable. There, small price
increases knock large numbers of
consumers out of the market. The
81 89 97 monopolist will target its price
toward the steep end of the curve
where large price increases will
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cause minimal decreases in additional sales. Thus, the
profit-maximizing price given the demand curve in
Figure 2 would be almost 200, four times higher than
the case of the linear demand curve. In this case, the
deadweight loss of 1835 is almost exactly the same as
the profits, unlike in the linear case, where the dead-
weight loss of 1250 is exactly half as large as the profits
which are 2500. The result is that only a small propor-
tion of the possible purchasers (about 10%) would buy
the product.
To help illustrate the effect of convexity on the dead-
weight loss to profit ratio, consider a demand curve
of the form p = 1 - qn, where p c (0,1). As shown in
the Appendix, the ratio of deadweight loss to profit
increases as n decreases (i.e., as the demand curve
becomes more convex). The converse also holds, so
that the ratio of deadweight loss to profit decreases as
n increases. For more complicated real-world demand
curves, there will not generally be a single measure
of convexity, but the general principle applies that
greater convexity will typically drive the monopolist
to serve a much smaller segment of the market and
produce comparatively large deadweight losses.
The trade-off between incentives for innovation vs.
current deadweight losses for convex demand curves
is not as favorable for the patent system as in cases
with linear demand curves. That is, traditional pat-
ent protection has a smaller effect on innovation than
in the linear demand case, and at the same time, the
deadweight losses are larger.
There is no established ratio of deadweight losses
to profit at which economists would agree that unre-
strained monopoly pricing of the patented product is
undesirable. The straight-line demand curve drawn
in Figure 1 might be thought to be somehow "aver-
age." The rules relating to patents - including their
twenty-year term - have grown in developed coun-
tries to reflect a societal willingness to trade-off incen-
tives for innovation (via profits) with deadweight loss
in the average case. In effect, the balance has been
established that, on average, 20 years of exclusive
exploitation of an innovation grants enough incen-
tive to innovate; the implication is that longer patent
duration would increase deadweight losses more than
it would spur on innovation.'7 For markets which have
much less favorable DWL/profits ratios, however, the
marginal cost of extending patent protection is much
higher for a given amount of benefit, and the optimal
period of patent protection - or the type of protection
offered - must be less. Indeed, if the DWL/profit ratio
is sufficiently unfavorable, the optimal period of exclu-
sion through patent protection will be zero.
It is well known that the optimal patent design should
vary depending on market demand and cost character-
istics, 8 and therefore the conclusion that the standard
patent rules are mal-adapted to markets with convex
demand curves will not be surprising. However, if one
could identify an important class of markets character-
ized systematically by highly convex demand curves,
there would be a strong case for altering the operation
of patents in those markets. As we show in the next
section, markets for needed medicines in developing
countries constitute precisely such a class.
Essential Medicine Patents in Developing Countries
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines essen-
tial medicines as "those that satisfy the priority health
care needs of the population.' 19 In creating its model
list of essential medicines that should be available in
every country, however, the WHO considers the cost
of accessing the drug and generally excludes patented
medicines with very high prices. 20 We are concerned
here with the access problems related to those medi-
cines that meet the WHO's definition of being "essen-
tial" in that they address priority health needs, and in
addition are (1) subject to patents or other exclusive
marketing rights,21 and (2) for which there are no
adequate substitutes. The lack of substitutes means
that the exclusive marketing right creates an effective
monopoly. The essential nature of the medicine for life
or health means that people requiring the medicine
will generally be willing to spend whatever resources
Igure 3
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Filgure 4. 1
ARV Demand if Price = 5% Income
Quartiy (unts in 550 000 people)
are available to them to buy that medicine. 22 The rela-
tive unlimited willingness of patients to pay for the
drug means that, in the sector of the population that
must pay for the medicine through private means
(which is large in developing countries), 23 the demand
curve is likely to be a function of ability to pay.24
The distribution of income and wealth in develop-
ing countries tends to be extremely uneven. There are
a few very wealthy families, with extensive holdings
and high income; at the other extreme, a large num-
ber of households have essentially no wealth and low
incomes. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of income
in South Africa in the form of average per capita
income for each decile of the population in 2000. The
richest 10% earned 58% of all income. Put another
way, the richest 10% earned an average of $29,626 a
year, more than 80 times the average income of the
poorest 10% (only $362).
High inequality in ability to pay in a country will
produce highly convex demand curves for essential
goods. Figure 4.1 is a demand curve for AIDS medi-
cine in South Africa constructed according to the
assumptions that (1) ability to pay is proportional to
annual income, and (2) the incidence of the disease is
equal among all income levels. This, in turn, implies
a demand curve having proportions very similar to
that in Figure 2, for which we demonstrated that the
deadweight loss created by monopoly pricing of the
good are very large compared to the incentives for
innovation enabled by such pricing. The shape of the
demand curve can be used to estimate the profit maxi-
mizing behavior of a monopolist in this market. Figure
4.1 assumes that people needing AIDS treatment in
South Africa will purchase an antiretroviral if the cost
is 5% of their income, which is at the outer edge of
what South Africans in the top 20% of income earners
spend on all of their out-of-pocket medical expendi-
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Fgu re 4.2
Revenue Per Quantity Sold
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tures.2 9 According to 2006 UNAIDS data, 5.5 million
people live with HIV/AIDS in South Africa.30 Since we
assume that HIV prevalence is uniform across income
deciles,31 each decile contains 550,000 people who will
need antiretroviral treatment. If a firm prices its anti-
retroviral at $1,481 per patient per year (5% of the per
capita GDP distributed to the highest income decile)32
then 550,000 people will buy it. In order to sell to a
greater proportion of the population, the price must
fall considerably - people in need of treatment in the
second-highest income decile will buy the medicine if
it is priced at $396, and half of the people in need of
treatment can purchase an antiretroviral if it is priced
at $92. In order to sell to all people with AIDS who
need treatment, the price would have to be lowered to
$18 per patient per year 33
Figure 4.2 shows the total sales revenue a firm will
gain if it sells at each price on the demand curve. The
firm maximizes its sales in South Africa by selling at the
price that only the top 10% can afford.34 At this price,
the firm makes $814.6 million in total revenue. If the
firm lowers its price to be able to make sales to 20% of
the affected individuals (at $396 per patient), then it
will sell twice as many medicines at a price less than half
of the profit-maximizing price, earning substantially
less ($435.6 million). As the monopolist continues to
cut prices and raise production, revenues fall further at
almost every level of output and corresponding price. In
other words, the firm will maximize its profits by setting
a price unaffordable for at least 90% of people in need.
To understand the effect that South Africa's ineq-
uitable income distribution has on the pricing and
output decision of a monopolist in that country, com-
pare it to the corresponding figures for Norway, which
has one of the most equitable income distributions.
Constructing a similar demand curve based on the
assumption that people will buy a medicine at prices
SYMPOSIUM
up to 5% of their income yeilds a flatter, less convex
demand curve (Figure 5.1).
The less convex Norwegian demand curve produces
incentives for the firm to serve a larger percentage of
the population through its pricing. Figure 5.2 shows the
total revenue a firm will receive if it sells at the price
affordable to each decile of the population. If it sets a
price at which only the top 10% of Norwegians will buy,
it will earn total revenues that are much lower than it
will receive if it lowers its price to one which a higher
percentage of the population can afford. The seller will
maximize profits by selling at the price affordable to all
but the poorest 20% of the population.
Because the monopolist's demand curve is flatter, the
firm cannot make up lost consumption by the majority
of the population with very high price increases at the
steeper end of the curve. Thus, the monopolist in this
economy will maximize profits by selling at the price
where 80% of the HIV+ population can afford to pur-
chase the product (Figure 5.2).
The table above shows the data used for graphs
4.1 through 5.2. Although at every income decile the
affordable price in Norway exceeds that in South
Africa, this does not mean that the profit-maximizing
price is below that of South Africa. As the table shows,
the profit-maximizing price in South Africa under our
assumptions is $1,481, slightly higher than the profit-
maximizing price in Norway. Of course, at this price in
South Africa, only the wealthiest 10% would be able to
afford the medicine while in Norway 80% of the popu-
lation would have access.
More generally, at high levels of inequality within
a country, a monopolist will maximize its revenue
by selling at a high price affordable to few people. In
countries with more equitable income distribution, a
ARV Demand if Price = 5% Income
4 Ou
1 2 3 4 5 0 7 6 10
Quantity (units of 250 people)
monopolist will maximize revenue by selling at a lower
price to a greater number of consumers. Appendix 2
further illustrates this point with demand and revenue
curves similar to the ones above for 12 nations with
varying degrees of income inequality (with Gini coef-
ficients ranging from 26.4 to 63.3).
Income inequality exists to a greater or lesser extent
in every developing country, where a small minority
often earns salaries that compare to those of advanced
industrialized countries and the majority live in pov-
erty.3 8 This inequality creates incentives for an unre-
strained monopoly supplier ineluctably to set drugs
prices high. The problem is that relatively rich people,
though few, are able to pay so much more for their
drugs that it is more profitable for a company to serve
them only. The greater the inequality of the income
or wealth distribution, the more severe this problem
becomes, with greater individual ability to pay on the
part of the very rich pushing the price up.3 9
One implication of this analysis is that it may be per-
fectly rational for a company to set very similar prices
in rich and poor countries, because the poor countries
are likely to have high income inequality leading to
highly convex demand curves. One area where there
are country-to-country price differences is for antiret-
roviral drugs to treat HIV/AIDS. Price discrimination
in this limited area is primarily the result of a vocal
activist campaign coupled with the introduction of
generic competition.40 Outside of this limited area,
drug prices in very poor countries are often not par-
ticularly low.41 Indeed, middle-income countries with
high inequality, such as Brazil and Mexico, often pay
higher prices for patented drugs than high-income
countries with lower inequality, such as the U.K. and
Sweden.42
Fjure 5.2
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Affordable P Q Sold at Total Sales at
(if this 5%Y) Each Price Each Price
1,481 550,000 814,550,000
396 1,100,000 435,600,000
213 1,650,000 351,450,000
138 2,200,000 303,600,000
92 2,750,000 253,000,000
61 3,300,000 201,300,000
50 3,850,000 192,500,000
46 4,400,000 202,400,000
32 4,950,000 158,400,000
18 5,500,000 99,000,000 1 881 2500 2,201,306
Sources: Statistics South Africa; UNAIDS
Toward Open License Strategies
As shown above, in the case of needed medicines in
developing countries where highly convex demand
curves are the norm, benefits from lower prices may
exceed any potential losses owing to reduced future
innovation. This is because demand for needed medi-
cines in developing countries has very special proper-
ties, contributing to larger deadweight loss relative to
extra producer surplus when monopolies restrict out-
put and raise prices. In these circumstances, the use
of compulsory licensing becomes one obvious remedy
to problems created by the indiscriminate enforce-
ment of property rules through patent laws in situa-
tions where they do not increase social welfare.43 Con-
verting the property rule to a liability rule through a
compulsory license allows a country to change most
of the deadweight loss into consumer surplus by using
competition to achieve the lowest possible price while
providing a measured contribution to research and
development expenses through a royalty payment.-
Evidence that pharmaceutical companies do not,
and lack incentives to, grant significant discounts in
poor countries contradicts the prescription offered
by Patricia Danzon and Adrian Towse, who suggest
that permitting confidential rebates to developing
countries will result in Ramsey pricing strategies with
higher prices in developed countries than in those that
are poorer.45 Our analysis above suggests that this will
not be the case for developing countries with unequal
wealth distributions.46
While price discrimination is possible within a coun-
try, in practice the consumers who benefit from such
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATIONS - SUMMER 2009
Sources: Statistics Norway; UNAIDS
discrimination are not the poor but rather the well
organized (e.g., insurance providers, the government,
or other large purchasers). With the exception of dis-
crimination in prices between large purchasers, it is
often difficult for companies to charge different prices
for different consumers within a country because of
the ease with which one segment would access prices
intended for another.47 Likewise, price discrimination
focused on discounts to government agencies, with the
assumption that such agencies will service the poor, is
likely to fail to ameliorate the conditions of large num-
bers of working people who earn too much money to
access government-operated clinics but earn too little,
and have too little insurance, to afford the extremely
high prices being targeted to the top sliver of income
earners.
The more direct, effective, and available tool to
accomplish lower prices in developing countries with
high-income inequality is for such countries to grant
open licenses, permitting competition by any qualified
supplier, for essential medicine patents. Such licenses
maximize the ability of competitive markets to push
prices down as close as possible to the marginal cost
of producing the drugs. The key will be for countries
to adopt legal standards that will quickly and eas-
ily recognize a duty to license intellectual property
rights, a refusal of which would trigger an open license
remedy.
One such source of legal authority for open licenses
may be found in "essential facility," "refusal to deal,"
and related competition law doctrines. On October
16, 2003, the South African Competition Commis-
Flynn, Hollis, and Palmedo
Affordable P Q Sold at Total Sales at
(if this = 5%Y) Each Price Each Price
4,864 250 1,215,960
2,683 500 1,341,748
2,348 750 1,761,045
2,138 1000 2,138,412
1,971 1250 2,463,366
1,782 1500 2,673,014
1,635 1750 2,861,698
1,468 2000 2,935,075
1,237 2250 2,783,080
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sion issued a declaration finding that pharmaceuti-
cal firms GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim
violated the South African Competition Act by refus-
ing to grant licenses for patents on essential AIDS
medicines."8 The Commission found that the drug
patents of the companies were "essential facilities" for
which it was economically feasible to grant competi-
tors access,49 and that the refusal to grant licenses to
generic firms caused an anti-competitive effect that
"outweighs its technological, efficiency or other pro-
competitive gain "5 As a remedy, the Commission
sought "an order authorising any person to exploit the
patents to market generic versions of the respondents
patented medicines or fixed dose combinations that
require these patents, in return for the payment of a
reasonable royalty."51 In our view, the South African
Competition Commission correctly weighed the ben-
efits and costs of monopoly pricing in that case, and
indeed, our analysis suggests that there may be merit
in a wider application of this approach.
The solution of compulsory licensing, of course,
leads to new problems - in particular that the firms'
incentives to innovate may be weakened. While this is
true, one of the points made here is that for markets in
which firms can expect demand to be highly convex -
which is likely to be true in markets for medicines in
most developing countries - the patent system will be
ineffectual in delivering much innovation. It is not just
that the countries are poor - it is that extreme income
inequality leads to a highly convex demand curve.
Ultimately, the problem of finding an adequate and
equitable mechanism to fund research and develop-
ment for medicines in developing countries must be
found elsewhere. While compulsory licensing in devel-
oping countries is likely to do little to hurt the existing
(negligible) incentives to innovate produced by such
markets,52 it clearly would not help. The most dif-
ficult problem here is that of so-called "Type III,7 or
"neglected" diseases, which are mainly prevalent in low-
and medium-income countries, and for which there is
no substantial market in high-income countries53 For
these diseases, patent exclusivity offers relatively little
incentive to invest in R&D, despite the potentially large
health gains that might be realized.54 Evidently, some
other system for encouraging innovation for develop-
ing countries is required, such as government-funded
basic research, global research and development pools,
rewards and prizes, or other strategies.5
Appendix 1
Given the inverse demand curve p 1 - qf. with q and p
both between 0 and I, the profit maximizing quantity and
price are given by
q= and
n
n+I
The profit and DWL arising from this is given by
n+1( 1n..l)
D WL ( iI( - q n )Jq
The deadweight loss to profit ratio that arises from this is
DW I+ I
DWL n n1 (n + I n (1 I n(+I
It is easy to verify that as n decreases, this ratio increases.
Appendix 2 - Graphic Representation of
Relationship Between Inequality and the
Revenue-Maximizing Point of Output
Here we present a series of tables and graphs to illus-
trate how a monopolist's profit-maximizing combi-
nation of price and output varies with the level of
inequality in an economy. A pharmaceutical firm with
unconstrained pricing power will maximize profits by
selling a greater quantity at a relatively affordable price
in economies with a fairly equitable income distribu-
tion, but will maximize revenues in less equitable econ-
omies by selling a smaller quantity at a higher price.
Using real GDP and population statistics from the
World Bank's development database, UNAIDS estima-
tions of people living with HIV/AIDS, and income-by-
decile statics from the World Institute for Development
Economics Research of the United Nations University
(UNU-WIDER) database, we have constructed a
series of demand and total revenue graphs similar to
the examples of South Africa and Norway in the body
of the paper (Graphs 4.1, 4.2, 5.1, 5.2).
We first calculate per capita income for each decile.
Assuming that people will be willing and able to pur-
chase a medicine priced at 5% of their income, we
derive a set of demand curves for 12 nations of varying
levels of income inequality. They are displayed in the
order of most equal (as measured by the Gini coeffi-
cient) to the least. As inequality increases, the demand
curves become more convex.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that disease
prevalence is equal among income deciles. We construct
graphs of total revenue (quantity demanded times price,
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for each price along the demand curve) against the
quantity sold. The revenue-maximizing price/quantity
combination in the two most equitable economies in
our sample, Finland and France, is that in which 80%
of the people who need the medicines will obtain them.
(In each of the tables in Appendix 2, the maximum rev-
enue and corresponding quantity sold are highlighted.)
For countries with higher Gini coefficients and more
convex demand curves, the revenue-maximizing point
moves leftward, indicating that monopolies in these
countries will earn the most money by charging prices
that smaller and smaller segments of the population
can afford. In the most unequal countries, monopolists
clearly maximize revenue by selling at high prices to
only the wealthiest 10% of the population.
The UNU-WIDER database on measurements of
equality is the most complete compilation of inequal-
ity data available, but it contains observations from a
variety of sources. We have taken steps to ensure that
the data used in this Appendix is comparable from one
country to another. Many other studies on equality
have suffered from problems arising from improper
cross-country comparisons. An excellent discussion
of common problems in studies of inequality, and a
guide on how to improve on cross-country compari-
sons is found in Deininger and Squire (1996).
In each country, surveys were conducted at the house-
hold level, then adjusted for the differing size of house-
holds in order to derive distribution-per-person. In all
of our observations, data is taken from surveys which
sampled the entire population, including all geographic
areas and all age groups. We ignored studies that only
surveyed urban populations or a subgroup of the entire
population (i.e., employees or people between the ages
of 15 and 64). We used only data points on distribution
of income, ignoring data points measuring the distribu-
tion of consumption. Finally, the UNU-WIDER data-
base gives each data point a numeric quality rating from
1 (highest) to 4 (lowest). We only included data rated
1 or 2, which indicate that the authors of the database
were able to verify the income concept and the survey
method (1), or at least one or the other (2).
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r-9L.N Gini=26.4 Year 2000
% Income by Decile % Income x GDP %lnc(GDP) /(Pop/ 10) Ave Inc. x 5% PWAs Total Revenue
23.20 27,970,592,800 54,037 2,702 150 405,277
13.40 16,155,428,600 31,211 1,561 300 468,165
i 1.50 13,864,733,500 26,786 1,339 450 602,675
10.30 12,417,978,700 23,991 1,200 600 719,716
9.30 11,212,349,700 21,661 1,083 750 812,301
8.30 10,006,720,700 19,332 967 900 869,948
7.50 9,042,217,500 17,469 873 1050 917,114
6.60 7,957,151,400 15,373 769 1200 922.354
5.70 6,872,085,300 13,276 664 1350 896,151
4.30 5,184,204,700 10,015 501 1500 751,160
GDP 120,562,900,000
Population 5,176,198
HIV+ 1,500
Demand if Price - 5% Income
20M-
0
2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ouawily (lunt"- 150 PWAs)
Total Revenue
1,000,000-
800.000
600,000-
400,000-
200,000
0*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Quantt (l unit - 150 PWAs)
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AFP C Gini=28.2 Year 2000
% Income by Decile % Income x GDP %Inc(GDP)/(pop/ 0) Ave Inc. x 5% PWAs Total Revenue
22.00 292,151,860,000 49,605 2,480 12,000 29,763,064
15.00 199,194,450,000 33,822 1,691 24,000 40,585,997
12.00 159,355,560,000 27,057 1,353 36,000 48,703,196
I 1.00 146,075,930,000 24,803 1,240 48,000 59,526,129
9.00 I 19,516,670,000 20,293 1,015 60,000 60,878,996
8.00 106,237,040,000 18,038 902 72,000 64,937,595
7.00 92,957,410,000 15,783 789 84,000 66,290,462
6.00 79,677,780,000 15,373 676 96,000 64,937,595
5.00 66,398,150,000 13,529 564 108,000 60,878,996
4.00 53,118,520,000 9,019 451 120,000 54,114,663
GDP 1,327,963,000,000
Population 58,895,520
HIV+ 120,000
Demand iN Price - 6% Income
3XI -
= 1.000
c, 600 ". 
.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ouantity 41 uillt 12,000 PWAs)
Total Revenue
OW=aa -
50=.GM
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ouantlay sold 11 unit 12.000 PWAs)
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POL D Gini=31.9 Year 1999
% Income by Decile % Income x GDP %Inc(GDP)/(pop/ 0) Ave Inc. x 5% PWAs Total Revenue
25.35 43,425,990,816 1 1,293 565 1,400 790,512
14.69 25,170,216,864 6,546 327 2,800 916,380
12.04 20,621,692,104 5,363 268 4,200 1,126,171
10.36 17,748,669,120 4,616 231 5,600 1,292,363
9.04 15,490,682,064 4,028 201 7,000 1,409,936
7.92 13,568,480,640 3,529 176 8,400 1,481,976
6.88 11,790,187,344 3,066 153 9.800 1,502,372
5.87 10,056,437,040 2,615 131 11,200 1,464,512
4,75 8,134,235,616 2,115 106 12,600 1,332,656
3,10 5,3 10,895,200 1,381 69 14,000 966,777
GDP 171,319,200,000
Population 38,453,800
HIV+ 14,000
Demand i Price -% Income
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ouallfy (I unilt =1,40 PWAOP
Total Revenue
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ouantity (I ufi 1.!400 PWAs)
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LA7VUA Gini=35.0 Year 1999
% Income by Decile % Income x GDP %Inc(GDP) /(pop/ 0) Ave Inc. x 5% PWAs Total Revenue
28,18 2,207,493,616 9,306 465 760 353,646
14.54 1,138,554,372 4,800 240 1,520 364,798
11.41 893,849,835 3,768 188 2,280 429,59 I
9.70 759,772,360 3,203 160 3,040 486,869
8.65 677,433,016 2,856 143 3,800 542,632
7.88 617,071,862 2,601 130 4,560 593,138
7,14 559,444,838 2,359 118 5.320 627,371
6.10 477,841,606 2,015 101 6,080 612,411
4.74 371,210,578 1,565 78 6,840 535,219
1.66 130,396,917 550 27 7,600 208,899
GDP 7,833,069,000
Population 2,372,000
HIV+ 7,600
Demand if Price = 5% Income
400-
3w
1~ 001
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 a 9 10
Ouahnty 1 ult - 760 PWAS)
Total Revenue
7100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 a 9 0
Quantity 11 unit - 760 PWAs)
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UMOIE I i 'AiS Gini=39.4 Year 2000
% Income by Decile % Income x GDP %Inc(GDP) /(pop/ 10) Ave Inc. x 5% PWAs Total Revenue
29.03 2,834,721,440,000 100,442 5,022 95,000 477,100,702
16.07 1,568,910,416,000 55,591 2,780 190,000 528,1 I 14,156
12,45 1,216,108,192,000 43,090 2,155 285,000 614,035,012
10.30 1,005,481,456,000 35,627 1,781 380,000 676,914,354
8.67 846,412,864,000 29,991 1,500 475,000 712,281,929
7.32 714,881,008,000 25,330 1,267 570,000 721,912,691
6.04 589,696,272,000 20,895 1,045 665,000 694,746,054
4.79 467,245,680,000 16,556 828 760,000 629,122,110
3.53 344,502,144,000 12,207 610 855,000 521,836,083
1.81 176,840,528,000 6,266 313 950,000 297,633,266
GDP 9,764,800,000,000
Population 282,224,000 1
PWAs (2003) 950,000 1 - I I
Demand iN Price = 5% Income
6,000 -
5,000-
S4.000-
3.000
2,000.
1,000
01
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Qua~tdy (lur 9KO00 PWAs
Total Revenue
800==0~
ROM=D.I3~ -
400MO= -
0~
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
OuanditY sold (lunh - 95,000 PWAs)
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VENEZUELA Gini=44. I Year 2000
% Income by Decile % Income x GDP %Inc(GDP) /(pop/ 0) Ave Inc. x 5% PWAs Total Revenue
32.70 38,302,077,904 15,755 788 11,000 8,665,272
16.52 19,348,395,171 7,959 398 22,000 8,754,570
12.36 14,482,954,274 5,957 298 33,000 9,829,655
9.78 1 1,462,839,944 4,715 236 44.000 10,373,184
8.02 9,390,498,900 3,863 193 55,000 10,622,299
6.54 7,664,882,302 3,153 158 66,000 10,404,390
5.28 6,181,261,484 2,543 127 77,000 9,788,925
4.15 4,864,004,551 2,001 100 88,000 8,803,266
3.05 3,571,789,557 1,469 73 99,000 7,272,576
1.60 1,878,895,915 773 39 110,000 4,250,721
GDP 117,147,600,000
Population 24,311,000
HIV+ 110,000
Demand if Price - 5% Income
k 00
2 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
Qlantty 41 u1l 1 11.000 PWAS)
Total Revenue
810M=~w -
SJDoM=
2,DUOJX)1J
0
1 2 3 4 5 5 7 a 9 t0
Osaontly 41 unit = 11,000 PWAs)
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UZ7BE5TAK Gini48. I Year 2001
% Income by Decile % Income x GDP %Inc(GDP) /(pop/ 0) Ave Inc. x 5% PWAs Total Revenue
35.45 4,042342,942 619 81 1,100 89,049
16.79 1,914,602,482 767 38 2,200 84,354
12.36 1,409,009,617 564 28 3.300 93,118
9,62 1,096,359,745 439 22 4,400 96,607
7.63 870,276,105 349 17 5,500 95,857
6.14 700,450,602 281 14 6,600 92,582
4.82 549,915,158 220 II 7,700 84,799
3.64 414,904,818 166 8 8,800 73,120
2.49 283,920,636 114 6 9,900 56,291
1.05 119,567,326 48 2 11,000 26,340
GDP 11,401,350,000
Population 24,967,000
PWAs 11,000
Demand if Price 6% Income
80-
Total Revenue
1z 1
40
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 a 9 t0
0Quanify (Il un ith 1. 100 PWAs
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PERU Gini=49.6 Year 2000
% Income by Decile % Income x GDP %lnc(GDP) /(pop/10) Ave Inc. x 5% PWAs Total Revenue
37.24 19,844,229,947 7,646 382 8,200 3,135,047
16.56 8,826,69 1,316 3,401 170 16,400 2,788,931
12.03 6,411,208,489 2,470 124 24.600 3,038,582
9.34 4,977,260,456 1,918 96 32,800 3,145,286
7.43 3,957,856,392 1,525 76 41,000 3,126,366
5.84 3,112,908,969 1,199 60 49,200 2,950,717
4.61 2,456,440,275 947 47 57,400 2,716,527
3.45 1,837,784,576 708 35 65,600 2,322,707
2.35 1,253,368,752 483 24 73,800 1,782,096
1.15 612,640,013 236 12 82,000 967,866
GDP 53,290,389,504
Population 25,952,192
HIV+ 82,000
Demand if Price 5% Income
500,
400-
0
1 2 3 4 5 5 7 8 9 10
Ouamtiy (1 unit 6200 PWAS)
Total Revenue
2,WU -
2=000 -
0*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ouantlty Sold (1 unh 8200)
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A DA Gini=54.6 Year 2000
% Income by Decile % Income x GDP %Inc(GDP)/I(pop/ 0) Ave Inc. x 5% PWAs Total Revenue
45.05 2,669,913,864 1,098 55 53,000 2,910,588
14.88 881,961,201 363 18 106,000 1,922,927
10.12 599,794,089 247 12 159,000 1,961,584
7.71 456,955,675 188 9 212,000 1,992,588
6.20 367,565,213 151 8 265,000 2,003,493
5.06 300,058,716 123 6 318,000 1,962,641
4.09 242,464,969 100 5 371,000 1,850,250
3.24 191,961,951 79 4 424,000 1,674,128
2.37 140,534,714 58 3 477,000 1,378,826
1.27 75,163,550 31 2 530,000 819,390
GDP 5,926,374,000
Population 24,308,740
HIV+ 530,000
Demand It Prce = 6% Income
50
S40,
50
120
10
3 4 5 5 7 8 9 10
Osaiothy (1unit -53.000 PWAs)
Total Revenue
1. 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10
Quantity 41 unI - 53.000 PWAs)
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MXIEMCO Gini=55.6 Year 2000
% Income by Decile % Income x GDP %Inc(GDP) /(pop/ 10) Ave Inc. x 5% PWAs Total Revenue
44,B 1 260,562,287,460 26,597 1330 16,0w 2 t ,277,773
15.49 90,083,357,427 9,195 460 32,000 14,712,591
10.40 60,470,380,592 6,173 309 48,000 14,814,212
7.90 45,913,620,628 4,687 234 64,000 14,997,406
6.26 36,425,102,265 3,718 186 80,000 14,872,549
4.94 28,715,126,559 2,931 147 96,000 14,069,433
3.90 22,673,082,952 2,314 116 112,000 12,960,544
3.01 17,493,486,568 1,786 89 128,000 11,428,283
2.14 12,463,840,052 1,272 64 144,000 9,160,285
1.14 6,626,086,425 676 34 160,000 5,410,927
GDP 581,426,400,000
Population 97,966,000
PWAs 160,000
Demand if Price = 6% Income
1400-0
1AOU
BM -
MCI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ouantly lunit-116,000 PWAs)
Total Revenue
25000,000 -
20,000,000
15.000.000 -
10,000.000
5,000.00
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Owantt Sold (11 Unit -16.000 PWA$)
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I3RAIL Gini=61.2 Year 2001
% Income by Decile % Income x GDP %lnc(GDP) I(popll 0) Ave Inc. x 5% PWAs Total Revenue
49.97 276,002,043,64B 15,64B 782 66,0051. 639,768
15.67 86,517,846,607 4,905 245 132,000 32,374,844
9.84 54,362,038,943 3,082 154 198,000 30,513,286
7.05 38,913,504,781 2,206 110 264,000 29,122,746
5.24 28,958,952,270 1,642 82 330,000 27,090,988
4.21 23,240,293,769 ,3 18 66 396,000 26,089,446
3.22 17,764,421,688 1,007 50 462,000 23,265,967
2.36 13,049,024,497 740 37 528,000 19,531,699
1.62 8,955,858,636 508 25 594,000 15,080,708
0.82 4,525,466,523 257 13 660,000 8,467,113
GDP 552,289,400,000
Population 176,377,000
HIV+ 660,000
Demand if Price =5% Income
4M
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ouanftly (I unit= 660O PWAO
Total Revenue
50,0=00j0
5o03no.cUD -
30DDDXD~Q
20O.OM0t -
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ouandly Sold (1 vunlt 66,O00 PWAsj
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BOLOVOA Gini=63.3 Year 2000
% Income by Decile % Income x GDP %Inc(GDP)/(pop/ 0) Ave Inc. x 5% PWAs Total Revenue
48.65 4,085,917,345 4,913 246 490 120,367
16.92 1,420,570,742 1,708 85 980 83,697
10.94 918,981,800 1,105 55 1,470 81,217
8.03 674,625,211 811 41 1,960 79,495
5.78 485,741,092 584 29 2,450 71,547
4.13 346,543,489 417 21 2,940 61,253
2.80 234,858,780 282 14 3,430 48,431
1.70 142,705,305 172 9 3,920 33,632
0.81 68,424,143 82 4 4,410 18,141
0.23 19,490,353 23 I 4,900 5,742
GDP 8,397,858,000
Population 8,316,648
PWAs 4,900
Demand of Price 60% Income
40,o
2M-
: 200-
S100 -
0~
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
OuantIy (I1 nt = 490 PWAs)
Total Revenue
140=00
120=000
100,000
40,01M
20=00
0
1 2 3 4 5 5 7 0 9 10
Ouanfhy So l (1 nift 490 PWAs)
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